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Abstract—Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an increasingly
attractive target for cybercriminals. We observe that many
attacks to IoTs are launched in a collusive way, such as brute-
force hacking usernames and passwords, to target at a particular
victim. However, most of the time our defending mechanisms
to such kind of attacks are carried out individually and inde-
pendently, which leads to ineffective and weak defense. To this
end, we propose to leverage Software Defined Networks (SDN)
to enable cooperative security for legacy IP-based IoT devices.
SDN decouples control plane and data plane, and can help bridge
the knowledge divided between the application and network
layers. In this paper, we discuss the IoT security problems and
challenges, and present an SDN-based architecture to enable IoT
security in a cooperative manner. Furthermore, we implemented
a platform that can quickly share the attacking information
with peer controllers and block the attacks. We carried out
our experiments in both virtual and physical SDN environments
with OpenFlow switches. Our evaluation results show that both
environments can scale well to handle attacks, but hardware
implementation is much more efficient than a virtual one.
I. INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an increasingly at-
tractive target for cybercriminals. We observe that normally
IoT systems are static targets and are expected to be attacked
due to the fact that many of them have low resource ca-
pabilities. They are not equipped with dynamic anti-attack
mechanisms to fight against collusive attacks from dedicated
attackers [1]. They also work individually and independently
to defend from the attacks, which makes themselves to be
easily compromised and particularly vulnerable when the same
attacking maneuvers can be applied to similar systems since
they have the same vulnerabilities. It is important to note, that
many illegitimate access attempts are neglected by the current
IoT software [2]. For instance, we are able to collect a great
amount of attacking information from the system logs of an
IoT system, when many attackers use a brute-force approach
to guess usernames and passwords. Even when these attacks
fail, they could be potential threats that may compromise the
system sooner or later. However, most of the current practice
ignores the failed attack’s traces, instead of taking advantage
of them. One reason is that such IoT devices have no enough
computing capabilities to run custom programs to handle such
kind of attacking information. Another more important reason
turns out to be the knowledge gap between the application
and network layers. The application layer can easily detect
application-layer attacks, such as brute-force password guess-
ing, which are transparent to the network layer, because of
the original design of TCP/IP protocol stack that naturally
separates application-layer and network-layer identifiers.
To bridge the divide between the application and network
layers, Software Defined Networks (SDN) is an emerging and
promising technology to make it happen. SDN decouples the
control plane from the data plane. An SDN controller can
take input from end systems applications and make decisions
to the data plane about what traffic can go through. SDN can
potentially benefit the security of IoT systems in at least three
aspects. First, it can help form a feedback-control loop from
end IoT systems to the SDN controller which further controls
one or more programmable switches. With the loop, attacks
to the victim can be blocked by the intermediate network
device, such as an OpenFlow switch. Second, similar attacks
to other victims from the same source in the same network
can be blocked and thus benefit the whole IoT network in
a collaborative way. Moreover, the attacking information can
be shared among multiple peering controllers that oversee
and control different networks. Other controllers that obtain
the attacking information can take the same actions to block
the malicious activities before they break into these peering
networks. To this end, we designed and built an SDN-based
platform that enables cooperative security for IoT systems. We
make the following contributions in the paper as follows:
(1) Protocol Design. We define the interfaces, functions and
protocols to enable an efficient communication model between
victims, OpenFlow switches and the controllers.
(2) Platform Implementation. We implemented the platform
using Ryu [3] controllers and OpenFlow switches in GENI [4].
We also tested the platform in a real hardware environment
using an OpenFlow switch and a Ryu-based controller.
(3) Performance Evaluation. The platform was evaluated
with its effectiveness and efficiency. We measured various
times, such as attack detection time, controller response time,
controller-to-controller sharing time and flow entry installation
time. The evaluation results show that the platform can effi-
ciently share attacking information with trustworthy peers and
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stop attacks in a timely manner. In addition, hardware-based
implementation can handle attacks more efficiently.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II introduces the IoT threat model. Section III describes
the overall protocol design and the implementation details.
Section IV presents the evaluation results. Finally, Section VI
concludes the paper.
II. THREAT MODEL
A successful cyberattack normally consists of several stages,
including reconnaissance, scanning, compromising, escalation.
The detection of an attack at its early stages, such as network
scanning for discovering open ports, can significantly decrease
the chances of the attack escalation. IoT devices are of the
particular interest for the attacks that use network scanning,
because they have certain ports open all the time ([5], [6]). In
our threat model, attackers attempt to compromise multiple
IoT devices simultaneously in different networks that are
connected by a few programmable switches, such as Open-
Flow switches. The switches are further controlled by many
logically centralized controllers. We also assume that the IoT
devices that are under attacks have not been compromised
yet. Namely, we primarily focus on stopping attacks when
they are still in scanning and compromising stages. We also
posit that some of the IoT devices in the networks are able to
detect attacks happening through the information collected by
their applications, e.g., system logs. They can extract attackers’
identity information, e.g., source IP addresses or port numbers.
Also these devices can run small custom programs, such as
small SDN agent programs to communicate with the SDN
controller. Normally such devices should be powerful enough
to run our SDN agent, which requires relatively small CPU
resources. Note that our design does not require every IoT
device to run a user program to identify attacks due to the
low resource capabilities of the small devices. However, in
our proposed topology those devices will be protected as well
thanks to more powerful devices in the network.
III. DESIGN OVERVIEW
A. Overall Design
In the design, we leverage SDN to build a scalable frame-
work that enables trustworthy and cooperative IoT security.
Figure 1 illustrates the high-level architecture. When an at-
tacker attempts to attack multiple IoT devices located in differ-
ent networks, assume one of them can detect such attacks, e.g.,
a mobile phone. The phone runs a user program to compose a
message that contains the attacker’s identity, e.g., IP address.
The message then is shared with the SDN controller over
UDP or TCP. After confirming the victim is a registered IoT
system, an SDN application running on the controller is used
to compose an OpenFlow switch message. The message is
then issued to the OpenFlow programmable switch. Once the
command takes effect, the attack will be stopped and other IoT
systems in the network will not receive similar malicious at-
tempts any longer. Meanwhile, the attacking information from
the victim is shared with other controllers that cover different
Fig. 1: Architecture of Cooperative IoT Security
networks. The other controllers perform the same tasks as the
first controller did when they receive the information: issuing
controlling commands to their programmable switches to filter
out malicious traffic. As we can see from Figure 1, an attack to
the washing machine in the second network is blocked because
of the cooperation. The following sections present the detailed
designs for corresponding interfaces, functions and protocols.
B. Protocol Design
A controller needs to handle many events, therefore, when
we design the protocol between controllers and victims, a few
modules are considered in the controller as follows.
(1) Initialization. During boot-up stage, the controller needs
to initialize itself and the OpenFlow switch, where a default
table-miss flow entry needs to be installed. Because initially
the flow table is empty and no data packets can be forwarded
between end hosts, the default flow entry can direct all received
packets to the controller, which subsequently processes these
packets based on their types and content.
(2) Registration. A controller needs to ensure the informa-
tion it receives is trustworthy, thus whoever sharing attacking
information with it should register themselves at the controller.
The IoT systems that have good resource capabilities and can
detect attacks need to be registered. Otherwise, a malicious
user or system can fool the controller through sharing arbitrary
false attacking information. Other controllers that want to be
shared with and are willing to share attacking information
need to be registered as well to benefit their networks. The
controller uses a specific port to receive messages from them
and maintains a list of registered IoT systems and controllers
that can share information with each other. In addition, as
an acknowledgment message, the controller sends a list of
required parameters, such as passcode, timestamp, source IP
address and port number to the registrars. When an attack
occurs, the registered victim needs to fill out the required
parameters in a data packet and share them with the controller.
(3) Normal Packet Handling. Two types of normal packets
are handled by the controller: Address Resolution Protocol
(ARP) packets and IP packets. Once receiving an ARP request
message, the controller replies with the MAC address of the
unknown IP address to the requester. For an IP packet, which
contains source and destination IP addresses, the controller
finds the corresponding output port and forwards the packet
to that port. This process is not done by the controller for
every packet. Instead, the controller installs a flow entry in
the flow table of the OpenFlow switch. Subsequently, an IP
packet that has the same destination IP address can be routed
by the flow rule in the flow table to its next hop.
(4) Attacking Information Message Handling. One of the
most important job for the controller is to handle messages
from the registered IoT systems, which as victims under
attacks may send the attacking information to the controller
for help. Upon receiving such message, the controller needs
to confirm that the sender is a registered and trustworthy host.
It is easy to confirm a registered host since the host sends to
the controller the passcode assigned during the registration. In
addition, the host’s IP address must be found in the list of IP
addresses of all registered hosts that the controller maintains.
To confirm a trustworthy host, it is relatively tricky, since the
challenge is that how the controller can tell that the host does
not fake a source IP address to ask the controller to block it.
In other words, the controller needs to see certain evidence to
justify that the reported suspicious traffic exists. Recall that
any IP packet with previously unknown source or destination
IP address needs to be forwarded to the controller by the
default table-miss rule installed in the OpenFlow switch, thus
the controller keeps a record about the prior communication
of the reported attack if it exists. If a victim reports an
attack, the controller searches a relevant record. If such record
exists, the controller trusts that the attack is ongoing and takes
actions to block the attack. This approach may not be able
to fully stop a host that has been compromised to report a
false alarm, but it is a good level of safeguard to ensure
that the host does not misuse its privileges. On the other
hand, if the message is from a neighbor controller, we will
conduct similar checks. It is possible that the neighbor network
has not yet been under attacks by the same source, so the
neighbor controller will not install the flow entry immediately
to the flow table in the OpenFlow switch. However, it will
keep the attacker’s information in its repository. When a new
data packet, originated from the same source, appears at the
controller, it will install the flow rules to the programmable
switch to stop the attack. As a result, both the entire victim and
neighbor networks can benefit from such information sharing
and collaboration.
Figure 2 shows the workflow between different components.
We skip the second controller on the figure due to the limited
space. Algorithms 1 and 2 show the pseudo code of both
controller and victim.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Methodology
We built up an experimental environment in GENI
testbed [7]. GENI (Global Environment for Network Innova-
tions) is an open infrastructure for at-scale networking and
distributed systems research and education that spans the US.
In the testbed, two controllers, two OpenFlow switches, two
victims and one attacker are emulated and located on different
Algorithm 1 Controller’s program pseudocode
1: procedure event on switch connect(s) ⊲ Triggered
when the switch s connects to the controller
2: Initialize a hash table Ts that stores the miss-flow
matched packet’s source IP addresses
3: Install the miss-flow into s
4: Add s to the list S of connected switches
5: end procedure
6: procedure event on peer message(ip) ⊲ Triggered by
an attack alert message from a peer controller
7: if Alert’s sender is verified then
8: Add ip to the block list L
9: for each s in S do
10: if ip exists in Ts then
11: Add the drop rule for ip on s
12: end if
13: end for
14: end if
15: end procedure
16: procedure event on ip packet(p, s) ⊲ Triggered by a
miss-flow matched packet p on the switch s
17: Update Ts with p.ip src
18: switch packet p do
19: case p is a registration packet:
20: Register the host with p.ip src as a “trusted”
21: Generate and send a passcode to p.ip src
22: case p is an attack alert and p.ip src is verified as
“trusted”:
23: Extract attacker’s IP address ip from p
24: if ip exists in Ts then
25: Install the drop rule for ip on s
26: Share ip with the peer controllers
27: end if
28: case p is an ARP request for ip
29: Send to p.ip src the next hop MAC for ip
30: case default:
31: if p.ip src is in a block list L then
32: Install the drop rule for p.ip src on s
33: else
34: Install the flow rules for p.ip src
35: Forward p to the output port
36: end if
37: end procedure
Algorithm 2 Victim’s agent pseudocode
1: procedure victim defense
2: Send the registration packet to the controller
3: Store the passcode assigned by the controller
4: Listen to attacks
5: if an attack from ip is detected then
6: Send the alert message to the controller containing
ip and the passcode
7: end if
8: end procedure
Fig. 2: SDN Workflow
Virtual Machines (VMs), as shown in Figure 3. The attacker is
connected with two networks which are controlled by the two
controllers. Each of the controllers operates one OpenFlow
switch on which Open Virtual Switch (OVS) software is
running. We set up the experiments as follows. Initially, both
controllers are initialized and install miss-flow entries in their
OpenFlow switches. After that, potential victims communicate
with their controllers and the two controllers talk to each
other for registration purpose. Eventually, the victims and the
peer controllers are added to the list of the trusted hosts.
Subsequently, the attacker launches the attack to the first
victim and the first packet is re-directed to the first controller.
The controller installs corresponding flow entries to the first
OVS and lets the following packets from the same source
go through. When the attacker’s packets arrive at the first
victim, the victim immediately discovers that it is an attack.
Instantly, the victim extracts the attacker’s identity information
and sends it to the first controller. After verifying the victim
as “trusted” and that the attacker’s data trace was recorded
previously, the controller issues OpenFlow commands to stop
the attack and meanwhile shares the attacking information with
the peer controller, which takes similar actions to block the
attack. Based on the scenario above, we measured: (1) the
time when the attacker’s packet reached the controller; (2) the
time when the victim detected the attack; (3) the time when the
first controller obtained the attacking information; (4) the time
Fig. 3: GENI Experimental Topology
when the flow entries were installed in OVS-1; (5) the time
when the second controller received the attacking information
and (6) the time when the flow entries were installed in OVS-2.
We used iperf client tool [8] to simulate the attack.
In addition to the GENI experiment, we conducted similar
experiments on a real hardware environment, including a Pica8
OpenFlow switch [9], a controller with Intel(R) Core(TM)2
Duo CPU E8400 @ 3.00Ghz machine, an attacker and a
victim on two Raspberry Pis [10] with ARMv7 Processor (rev
4 (v71)). We performed 10 rounds of experiments for each
setting.
B. Results in GENI environment
1) Attack alert time: Figure 4(a) shows the attack alert time
by the victim to the controller. It is the duration from when
the attack was discovered by the victim to when the controller
received the alert message. On average, it takes around 520
ms to alert a new attack for the ten experiments.
2) Flow installation time on OpenFlow switch 1 and 2:
It is challenging to obtain the flow installation time because
it requires high precision time synchronization between the
switch and the controller. From the controller’s perspective,
it can record the time when the rule was issued out to the
flow queue, where rules are waiting to be installed in the
flow table, but it cannot keep track of when the flow entry
was successfully installed in the switch’s flow table. In our
experiment, we addressed this problem by the following steps.
First, we set a hard timeout value for the flow entry and issue
the installation command to the OpenFlow switch. When the
flow entry expires, it generates an event that is handled by
the controller. The timestamps of the flow issuing and the
event handling procedure call can be captured at the controller.
Thus, we can calculate the total round trip time from when
the flow rule was issued to when the expiration message was
received. In order to calculate the flow installation time, we
need to subtract the hard timeout value and the single trip
time from the OpenFlow switch to the controller. The single
trip time can be obtained by halving the round trip time of
a packet traveling from the controller to the switch and then
back to the controller. Finally, Figure 4(b) demonstrates the
flow installation time from Controller 1 to OVS-1. On average,
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Fig. 4: GENI experiments (Controller-1’s network)
(a) Information sharing time between two
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Fig. 5: GENI experiments (Controller-2’s network)
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Fig. 6: Hardware experiments
it takes about 46ms for the 10-round experiments to install a
flow rule in OVS-1. Figure 5(b) shows similar results in OVS-
2.
3) Attacking information sharing time: It can also be called
propagation or delay time from one controller to another.
Figure 5(a) shows the time period from when Controller 1
starts sharing the attacking information to when Controller 2
accepts the information. The average sharing time is around
436ms. When there are multiple controllers who want to
share the same attacking information, the delay determines the
overall performance of the system. The delay also depends on
what type of network topology being used. For example, the
efficiency of a ring topology will be higher than that of a
straight-line kind of topology.
4) Total time: Figure 4(c) shows the total time consumed
to stop the malicious traffic for a single controller scenario,
including alert time and flow installation time. On average,
it takes 566ms to block the attack in a virtual environment
on GENI. Figure 5(c) shows the total time in a two-controller
scenario, where it takes about 1003ms to finish the whole loop.
From the results, we can observe that the system is scalable,
particularly when multiple controllers can be well connected
to each other.
C. Results in Hardware Environment
1) Attack alert time: Figure 6(a) shows the duration from
when the attack was detected by the victim to the time when
the controller learns about the attack from the victim. The
average alert time is 306ms, which is less than in the virtual
environment by 40%. This can be explained by the hardware-
implemented flow matching mechanism in Pica8, that operates
significantly faster than the algorithm implemented in OVS.
2) Flow installation time on Pica8 OpenFlow switch:
Figure 6(b) shows the duration between issuing the flow instal-
lation command by the controller and the actual installation
on the Pica8 switch. We used similar calculation techniques
as we did in the GENI environment. It is surprising that the
average time of flow installation on the hardware switch is
50ms, which is slower by almost 9% than that in the OVS
on GENI. The slower performance in the real environment
can be explained by two main reasons: (1) Different from
flow matching operations, writing on the hardware such as
TCAM chips is relatively slow, because in order to guaran-
tee fast matching, the entries on TCAM need to be sorted
properly ([11], [12]); (2) The resources obtained in the GENI
experiment were located on the same hardware, but in the
real environment the controller and the OpenFlow switch are
connected via a physical link.
3) Total time: Figure 6(c) shows the total time needed to
detect the attack and install the rules in the Pica8 switch, so the
switch will drop all subsequent packets from the attacker. The
average total time is 358ms. The same measurement in the
GENI environment is about 566ms as shown in Figure 4(c).
Overall, the performance of our solution in the hardware
environment outperforms the one in the virtual environment
by 37%.
V. RELATED WORK
The pros and cons of leveraging SDN for a network security
are described by Dabbagh et al. in [13]. In particular, the
authors highlight the significance of the centralized controller
that is able to detect the intrusions on a Network-Wide
scale, contrary to network edge devices such as firewalls and
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) devices.
Skowyra et al. in [14] present L-IDS, the Learning Intrusion
Detection System that secures mobile devices with constrained
hardware and CPU resources. In L-IDS, the SDN controller
detects anomalies by collecting traffic counters values from
the supervised OpenFlow switches that connect the mobile
devices into one network. Moreover, the controller is able to
detect physical anomalies such as unexpected relocations of
the devices, a sign of a possible forge of mobile host’s identity.
Faluzac et al. in [15] present a model of an SDN-based
architecture with clustered controllers for securing Internet of
Things (IoT) devices. The authors show the scalability of such
architecture when using border controllers that work over a
specific SDN domain. In the proposed architecture, border
controllers are exchanging security rules with their peers
from other SDN domains, similarly to our implementation.
However, paper does not elaborate on specific algorithms and
shows no evaluation of an attacking scenario. The similar idea
is introduced by Vandana in [16]. In the proposed architecture,
the network of IoT devices is divided into segments with at
least one SDN-capable node. Each IoT device runs an agent
and registers at the closest SDN-capable node (a gateway
controller). The communication between segments is provided
through the gateway controllers, that authenticate the inner
traffic of the IoT network and block the illegitimate traffic.
As with [14], the methods described in ([15], [16]) can be
combined with our solution as well. In our work, we take
advantage of the application information from end systems and
enable the cooperation between hosts, programmable switches,
and the SDN controllers, so that all IoT devices in the networks
can be protected even when only one individual host was
attacked by an attacker.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduce a trustworthy, cooperative and scalable ar-
chitecture to enable IoT security among multiple networks.
The architecture is powered by SDN technologies, where the
controller application can take input about malicious activities
from its end systems and translate their requirements to the
network-level flow rules to stop attacks quickly. The architec-
ture can not only benefit the victims under attacks, but any
other potential targets in the networks. In addition, we solved
the trust problem through double checking the traces of the
malicious traffic. Meanwhile, we measured the time spent in
each phase in both virtual and real environments. The results
show that the overall hardware implementation outperforms
the same implementation in a virtual environment.
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